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Article 2

The Acquisition of Property Rights
Stephen R. Munze*

I shall argue that an "historical" principle for acquiring property is philosophically plausible. Here "historical" refers, not to
the complex actual course of history, but to the view that certain
past actions by persons may entitle them to rights of private
property. Robert Nozick's "entitlement" theory of justice is one
possible "historical" principle in this sense.' My argument unfolds
in the context of Jeremy Waldron's stimulating discussion of historical entitlement in his recent book on property.2 This discussion has received very little attention in the reviews of his book
that I have seen.'
Specifically, I shall advance three claims. First, Waldron
mischaracterizes the nature of an historical principle of justice in
acquisition. Second, Waldron is mistaken in holding such a principle to be an unfamiliar feature of our morality. Rather, this sort
of principle squares nicely with the prominence of moral desert
and with the lack of moral appeal in saying that someone is generally entitled to benefit from another's efforts. Third, the most

*

Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles.

An earlier version of this article was presented at a symposium on Professor
Waldron's book at the American Political Science Association meeting in San Francisco
on September 1, 1990. I learned much from the other participants-Judith Garber,
Jeremy Shearmur, and Jeremy Waldron. I had a particularly fruitful conversation with
Professor Waldron after the.formal session. His response was especially courteous in
light of the fact that some intellectual disagreements persist between us. I have also
benefitted from the written criticisms and suggestions of David Dolinko, Douglas Fleming, Thomas Morawetz, Kurt Nutting, Jeremy Paul, Gary T. Schwartz, M.B.E. Smith, and
Leeron Travish. I thank the members of the Law and Philosophy Discussion Group
in Los Angeles for an illuminating discussion of a draft of this article. With gratitude I
acknowledge the assistance of a Fellowship from the National Endowment for the Humanities and financial support from the Academic Senate and the Dean's Fund at
UCLA.
1 R. NozicK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND' UTOPIA 150-82 (1974).
2 J. WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 253-83 (1988).
3 See Dunn, Claims and Contexts, London Times Literary Supplement, May 5-11,
1989, at 489; Knowles, Book Review, 40 PHIL. Q. 116 (1990); Oakeshott, Book Review, 61
POL. Q. 363 (1990); Paul, Can Rights Move Left?, 88 MICH. L -REv. 1622 (1990); Pottage,
Propeily: Re-appropriatingHegel, 53 MOD. L REV. 259 (1990); Steiner, Book Review, 101
ETHICs 201 (1990).
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plausible historical principle is, as I contend elsewhere,4 a heavily
qualified justification for private property that is part of a
"pluralist"-that is, multi-principled-account of property rights. So
my argument will give little aid or comfort to libertarians such as
Nozick.
The deployment of my argument requires a brief explanation
of some recent writing on property. Only with this explanation
will it be plain to nonspecialists what is at stake and why it is
important.
I.

THE BACKGROUND

Contemporary discussion of acquisition takes place against
the backdrop of theories regarding the state of nature. John
Locke conceived of this state as a situation without a society or
government in which land and other things were held in common. He put forward a labor theory of property as an account of
how things held in common could be reduced to private ownership. By "mixing" his or her labor with an unowned thing, a person could acquire a private property right in it.5
Comes later Nozick, who offers an engagingly written discussion of property that stands squarely in the tradition of Locke.
Nozick has no use for the idea of "mixing" labor with unowned
things.6 But he finds great merit in the central Lockean thought
that persons have property rights in themselves and their labor,
and so own whatever their labor produces. He develops this
thought into what he calls an historical entitlement theory of justice. This theory not only rejects utilitarian accounts of property,7
it also opposes theories of justice that prescribe a particular pattern of distribution of property.' Nozick's theory of property
entitlements takes this form:
1.

4

A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the

S. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 254-91 (1990).

5 J. LOCKE, The Second Treatise of Government ch. v, especially § 27, in Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (P. Laslett 2d ed. 1967) (3d ed. 1698) [hereinafter J. LOCKE, First

or Second Treatise].
6 R. NOZICK, supra note 1, at 174-75. J. WALDRON, supra note 2, at 184-91, also
criticizes the idea of mixing.
7 See, e.g., J. BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 109-23, 148-98 (C.K. Ogden
ed. 1931).
8 An example is Rawls' difference principle, which requires that social and economic inequalities be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged. See J. RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 60-65, 78-83, 302-03 (1971).
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2.

3.

principle of justice in acquisition is entitled to that holding.
A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the
principle of justice in transfer, from someone else entitled
to the holding, is entitled to the holding.
No one is entitled to a holding except by (repeated) applications of 1 and 2.'

This essay grapples with the nature and justifiability of a principle of justice in acquisition (PJA).' Some readers may see as
vanishingly small the chance that anyone could write anything
new about Nozick. His work has received a sustained examination
at the hands of G.A. Cohen," Thomas Nagel, 2 and others.1 3
A common complaint is that Nozick's PJA is so incomplete as to
be almost without content.
Waldron's book advances the ball impressively. His chapter
on historical entitlement is not a clutch of cavils with Nozick's
text. Instead, it questions, in perceptive detail, the very idea of a
PJA. The questioning occurs in the middle of a long book that
weaves together sophisticated contemporary discussions of the
nature of rights and painstaking examinations of Locke and
14
Hegel.
Especially pertinent here is Waldron's distinction between
general rights and special rights.'" A general right involves an
individual interest that is sufficiently important to justify duties on
others because of the qualitative nature of the interest-for example, an interest in developing individual freedom. Hegel's account
of property, Waldron holds, is a general-right-based theory.1 6 A
special right involves an individual interest that is sufficiently im-

9

R. NozIcK, supra note 1, at 151. For second thoughts, see R. NoZIcK, THE Ex-

AMINED LIFE: PHILOSOPHICAL MEDITATIONs 286-96 (1989) (especially at 292).

10 Waldron's use of the term "principle of justice in acquisition" and the acronym
"PJA" seems to presuppose that all PJAs are historical. See, e.g., J. WALDRON, supra
note 2, at 257 and passim. For purposes of this paper, I follow what I take to be
Waldron's usage.
11 See, e.g., Cohen, Sef-Ownership, Word-Ownership, and Equality, in JUSTICE AND
EQUALITY HERE AND Now 108 (F. Lucash ed. 1986); Cohen, Robert Nozick and Wilt
Chamberlain: How Patterns Preserve Liberty, 11 ERKENNTNIS 5 (1977).
12 Nagel, Libertarianism Without Foundations, in READING NOZICK.- ESSAYS ON "ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA" 191 (J. Paul ed. 1981).
13 See, e.g., the collection edited by Jeffrey Paul, supra note 12.
14 G.W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (T.M. Knox trans. 1965).
15 J. WALDRON, supra note 2, at 106-24 and passim.
16 Id. at 343-89. For the view that talk of rights and the justtfication of private property misapprehends Hegel's concerns, see Pottage, supra note 3, at 263, 264, 270.
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portant to justify duties on others because some event, action, or
transaction occurred. Locke's and Nozick's accounts of property,
Waldron maintains, are special-right-based theories." - In Locke's
account, the mixing of labor with unowned things is the action
that justifies property rights for the laborer with correlative duties
on others. In Nozick's case, the relevant event called for by his
PJA is left unclear. All the same, Waldron's target is not the details of Nozick's PJA or any particular special-right-based approach. Rather, Waldron explores the overall structure of such an
approach to private property. He wants to question the core "idea
that individuals can, by their own unilateral actions, impose
moral
18
resources."
certain
using
from
refrain
to
duties on others
The appraisal of Waldron's views will be clearer if we make
the following observations. (1) People use the word "property" to
refer both to things and to relations among persons with respect
to things. Ordinarily the context makes evident which usage is
meant. In the latter usage, the relations include the familiar
Hohfeldian bundle of claim-rights, liberties, powers, and immunities.19 I shall use "property" mainly in this Hohfeldian way. This
20
usage more or less comports with Waldron's use of the term.
(2) Acquisition can be original or subsequent. Original acquisition
occurs with resources that either have never been owned or
though once owned have become unowned. 2 1 Subsequent acqui-

17 J. WALDRON, supra note 2, at 137-283.
18 Id. at 253. Of the reviews cited earlier, Paul, supra note 3, at 1625, 1628-31, devotes the most space to this phase of Waldron's book. Here he finds Waldron's case to
be persuasive. Thus, in resisting Waldron's discussion of historical entitlement, I shall
probably be resisting Paul as well. Paul does say, however, that qualifying a special-rightbased theory with "exceptions for those in need greatly complicates the topic." Id. at
1631 n.21.
Paul's reflective and searching essay merits more attention than is appropriate in
these pages. His inspiration comes from work, associated with communitarianism and the
critical legal studies movement, that views skeptically the concept of private property,
"rights analysis," and concentration on individuals. Whether Paul would find my positions
on these matters more, or less, successful than Waldron's is unclear. It is clear that
some loss of focus would result from addressing these concerns here.
19 W. HotFELD, FUNDAMENTAL
SONING (W. Cook ed. 1923).

LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REA-

20 J. WALDRON, supra note 2, at 26-61. Waldron relies more heavily than I do on
the views of A.M. Honori and particularly Ronald Dworldn. I do not think that this
reliance poses any difficulty for the present discussion. For my understanding of property, see S. MUNZER, supra note 4, at 15-36.
21 The latter possibility is exemplified, in Anglo-American law, by the rule that a
wild animal if captured becomes the property of the person who seizes it but reverts to
an unowned state if it escapes. See generally Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175, 2 Am. Dec.
264 (N.Y. Sup. Ci 1805).
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sition occurs with owned resources that later become the property
of someone else without lapsing into an unowned state. Traditionally, Lockean theories have dealt mainly with original acquisition.
Nozick's PJA seems, concerned solely with original acquisition;
what I call subsequent acquisition would presumably fall under his
principle of justice in transfer. Waldron oscillates. As will become
evident, his principal concern is historical theories of original
acquisition, but his schema for a PJA also applies readily to subsequent acquisition. (3) A PJA can be unqualified or qualified. It
is qualified if one or more restrictions exist on the property
rights gained by the acquirer. As will emerge, Waldron's text
is not always clear on whether he objects to all PJAs or only to
those that lack heavy restrictions.
This background sketch glosses over many details and subtleties, but to be forthright I should display here and now my own
axe for grinding. In a new book, I offer a principle of desert
based on labor (labor-desert principle) as one of three central
principles in a pluralist theory of property. 22 My book and
Waldron's crossed in the mail: Mine appeared after his, and his
came into my hands only as mine was going to press and I
was unable to take his study into account.23 If Waldron's case
against a PJA is sound, that would militate to some extent against
the labor-desert principle. I therefore have a vested interest in
Waldron's turning out to be mistaken.
Nevertheless, the labor-desert principle differs sharply from
the positions of Locke and Nozick. It is heavily qualified by elements within that principle and by a principle of utility and efficiency and a principle of justice and equality. If my theory of
property as a whole is cogent, then it will be no victory for
Lockeans or libertarians should my criticisms of Waldron in this
essay be well taken. So I have two purposes here. One is to save
the labor-desert principle. The other is to show more generally
that some PJA is philosophically plausible as part of the justification of rights of private property.
The debate is important because, if I am right, an historical
perspective that centers on desert by labor reorients this portion
of the theory of property in a moderately egalitarian direction.
For over a decade and a half, under the influence of Nozick, any

22 S. MUNzER, supra note 4, at 254-91.
23 Id. at ix.
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entitlement theory of justice has appeared to support a form of
libertarian capitalism that can endorse extreme economic inequality. Those who have tried to refute the entitlement theory generally suppose that a new egalitarian stance must rest on some conception of the equal worth of persons. These conceptions may invoke equal counting of persons in a utilitarian sense, equal rights
to a decent and fully human life, or some other vision of equality.
I agree that these conceptions support moderate egalitarianism. I
even use them in my pluralist account. But it is a mistake to ignore further support that focuses on what people do by working-support that comes from the reoriented version of historical
entitlement that I call the labor-desert principle.
II.

WALDRON'S CHARACTERIZATION OF A PRINCIPLE OF
JUSTICE IN ACQUISITION

Waldron offers the following complex schema for a PJA: "For
all x and for all r, if x does A with respect to r, then, for all oth24
er individuals y, x acquires a right that y refrain from using r."
In this schema, x and y range over individual persons, r ranges
over resources, and A ranges over acts. To accept a PJA, Waldron
writes, is to accept "that there are actions which individuals can
perform whose moral effect is to place millions of others under
obligations whose discharge may require them to place their own
survival in jeopardy."

25

This characterization of a PJA is problematic in at least two
respects. First, it is unclear whether a PJA applies only to original
acquisition or to subsequent acquisition as well. Waldron appar26
ently intends that it apply principally to original acquisition.
Yet the schema just quoted applies readily enough to subsequent
acquisition, too.
One type of subsequent acquisition, as defined in Part I,
is transfer. Transfer can occur by way of sale, gift, bequest, or
intestate succession. Consider sales. Suppose that we replace "does
A" in Waldron's schema with "pays the owner of r a mutually
agreed sum of money." Then x acquires a right that all individuals

24 J. WALDRON, supra note 2, at 265. This complex schema replaces a preliminary
formulation at 263.
25 Id. at 267.
26 Immediately before the section entitled "Acquisition" in which the complex schema for a PJA appears, Waldron says that for "the rest of this chapter, I shall mainly
ignore the issue of transfer and concentrate on original acquisition." Id. at 262.
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y, including the former owner, refrain from using r. The schema
therefore applies to garden-variety cases of transfer.
It also applies to a second type of subsequent acquisition as
defined in Part I. This type is adverse possession. Under the doctrine of adverse possession, a person who possesses the land of
another can sometimes become the new owner of that land. The
usual requirements are that the possession of the usurper must be
actual, exclusive, open and notorious, hostile and under claim of
right, and continuous throughout the statutory period (21 years at
common law but typically less in the United States today). 7
Thus, if the adverse possessor occupies the resource in this way
long enough, he or she gains a right that the titie owner and
others refrain from using the land. Adverse possession differs
from original acquisition because the resource is already owned. It
differs from transfer because the adverse possessor divests the title
owner and gains a new title. In legal parlance, there is no "privity
28
of estate" between the title owner and the adverse possessor.
Thus, Waldron's characterization of a PJA is problematic because,
though seemingly intended to apply just to original acquisition, it
in fact also applies quite easily to subsequent acquisition.
A second, much more serious problem concerns whether a
PJA can be qualified. If it cannot' much of the interest of
Waldron's chapter evaporates. If it can, the moral effect of accepting a PJA need not be what Waldron says it is. I shall explain.
To "qualify" a PJA is to subject it to a proviso or some other
restriction that reduces the strength of x's right or eliminates it
entirely or that decreases or eliminates y's obligations. The most
familiar proviso is Locke's clause that there be "enough, and as
good left in common for others." 29 This clause is hardly the only
candidate for a suitable proviso. Other candidates include Locke's
recognition of a right to the necessities of life," his no-spoilage
limitation,"1 Nozick's efforts to amend Locke, 2 and David
27 See generally R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 757-64 (1984).
28 On the new tide, see id. at 758. For privity of estate, see, e.g., Belotti v.
Bickhardt, 228 N.Y. 296, 127 N.E. 239 (1920) (privity of estate and "tacking" between
adverse possessors); Howard v. Kunto, 3 Wash. App. 393, 477 P.2d 210 (1970) (same).
29 J. LOCKE, Second Treatise, supra note 5, § 27. WALDRON, supra note 2, at 209-18,
280-83, rejects the widely-held view that Locke intended to restrict his labor theory of
acquisition with this language.
30 J. LOCKE, Firt Treatise, supra note 5, § 42.
31

J. LOCKE, Second Treatise, supra note 5, § 31.

32 R. NozIcK, supra note 1, at 175-78.
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Gauthier's version of the Lockean proviso." This short list is not
exhaustive. No need exists to fix on one candidate here and now.

The immediate point is that, in order to avoid making a PJA
obviously unattractive, one can qualify it with a proviso that does
not put the survival of others in jeopardy.
Waldron's text is unclear. One passage allows that a PJA
could be "heavily qualified by a very strong Lockean proviso." 4
Thus the expression "qualified PJA" is not a contradiction in
terms for Waldron. However, his complex schema for a PJA contains no qualification.5 And he ignores the possibility of a qualification in a passage
quoted earlier 6 and in other passages from
57
the same chapter.
The choice is clear. If Waldron says that a PJA cannot be
qualified, a PJA, so understood, might well imperil the survival of
others. But such a PJA would be a straw target. Waldron would
be caricaturing defenders of a PJA before butchering them. An
unqualified PJA is so hopelessly unattractive as not to be worth
further consideration.
If Waldron says that a PJA can be qualified, his initial claim
is extravagant. He says that to accept a PJA is to accept the possibility of actions-namely, acts of acquiring property-whose moral
effect may place nonacquirers' "survival in jeopardy."" Without
further argument, the asserted equivalence is implausible if one
qualifies a PJA.
It is possible to expand charitably on the spirit, if not the
letter, of Waldron's discussion in this way. He might concede that
one can always qualify a PJA. The point is that one cannot do so
in cafeteria style-by imposing gimmicky or ad hoc restrictions. I
agree. But agreement on this point shows only that the tough
intellectual work remains to be done. His chapter does not attempt this work. Now Waldron might add that a qualified PJA, in
order to be successful, must be highly unified. It must show, he
might insist, how the reasons for the qualifications spring from

33 D. GAtrrHER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT 190-232 (1986).
34 J. WALDRON, supra note 2, at 266.
35

Id. at 265, quoted at text accompanying note 24 supra.

36 Id. at 267, quoted at text accompanying note 25 supra.
37 He writes that "if some PJA is true, then individuals are in a position to make it
morally difficult or morally impossible for others to secure their own survival." Id. at
268. For others to discharge the duty of respecting an acquirer's property rights "may
be dangerous." Id. at 269.
38 Id. at 267.
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the same moral foundation as the reasons for the unadorned
principle itself. This test of success is too high. Some qualifications may pass it. Others are likely to fail it-even though there
may be strong reasons for the qualifications. The Conclusion
touches on these concerns.
III.

WALDRON ON TE ALLEGED UNFAMIUAmIUY OF A
PRINCIPLE OF JUSTICE IN ACQUISrON

Waldron devotes an entire section to exposing "the radical

unfamiliarity of a PJA." 9 He claims to have shown that "a PJA
would be an unfamiliar, and maybe unwelcome, addition to a
morality just like our own." 4 At least three problems bedevil his
argument. One is whether familiarity is an appropriate standard.
The next is a misleading analysis of a possible analogy between a
PJA and a duty to rescue. A third concerns the intentions of
acquirers. First, though, I need to explain his argument.
Waldron argues that a PJA might be familiar if we could
find some widely acknowledged moral duty that has at least these
features:
(1) the duty is owed to and benefits some individual x;
(2) the duty comes into existence as a result of some action a
byx,
(3) discharging the duty may be dangerous or morally embarrassing to those who have it; and
(4) those who have 4the duty have not consented to being put
in that position. '
He then suggests that an analogy may lie "along the lines of our
duty to rescue or come to the aid of someone who has injured
42
himself or put himself in danger."
There is an initial problem in Waldron's search for familiarity. Waldron never says that a moral principle must be familiar to
be plausible, persuasive, sound, cogent, or correct. But much of
his discussion tacitly supposes that familiarity would be strong evidence of such characteristics as plausibility, persuasiveness, and so
on. And he looks carefully for an analogy. The problem lies in

39 Id. at
at 266-71.
40 Id. at
pugnant." Id.
41 Id. at
42 Id.

265. The section is Chapter 7, section 4, entitled "Contingent Rights'--id.
270. He also says that "[o]n the face of it, [a PJA] seems unfamiliar and reat 265.
269.
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the apparent assumption that every moral principle should be
familiar in the sense that it is assimilable to some other moral
principle. But why may not some moral principles be sui generis?
Familiarity is too high a standard because not every moral principle that is plausible, persuasive, etc. may be analogous to some
other principle. Consider abortion. A possible view of abortion is
that having an abortion differs significantly from committing murder, having a tumor removed, practicing contraception, and so
on. If it is relevantly different from these other acts, then, whatever moral principle, if any, applies to abortion may find no parallel
in other moral principles. Again, the duty of fair play" may not
be analogous to other moral duties. Neither may the duty to keep
promises. Therefore, even if Waldron could show that a PJA is
unfamiliar in the sense of lacking analogies, it would hardly follow
that it is not a plausible, persuasive, sound, cogent, or correct
moral principle.
A second problem concerns the search for an analogy between a PJA and a duty to rescue. One reason for rejecting the
analogy is connected with Waldron's earlier lack of clarity on
whether a PJA can be qualified. If it cannot be qualified, acquisition may indeed put the survival of nonacquirers in jeopardy. For
example, should some eager persons acquire all the food available
in a state of nature, other people might starve if the acquirers'
rights to the food were unqualified. Waldron apparently relies on
this possibility for the third feature-namely, that "discharging the
duty may be dangerous." However, the moral duty to rescue, as
usually understood, does not require a rescuer to put himself or
herself at anything more than slight risk." For a rescuer to em-

43 For discussion of the duty of fair play, see, e.g., K. GREENAWALT, CONFLICTS OF
LAW AND MORALITY 121-58 (1987).
44 For utilitarian and deontological arguments for a moral duty of easy rescue, see
Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE UJ. 247, 279-92 (1980). Epstein, A Theosy of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 189-204 (1973), opposes such a duty.
Anglo-American law recognizes a duty to rescue primarily when the potential rescuer and the person in danger have a "special relationship," for example, proprietor-customer, carrier-passenger, educator-pupil, and so on. See, e.g., Devlin v. Safeway Stores,
Inc., 235 F. Supp. 882, 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Buch v. Amory Mfg. Co., 69 N.H. 257, 44
A. 809 (1897). See generally W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 56, at 375-77 (5th ed. 1984). Weinrib, supra, argues
that there should be a legal duty of easy rescue. For the interplay of legal penalties for
nonrescue and legal rewards for rescue, see Levmore, Waitingfor Rescue: An Essay on the
Evolution and Incentive Structure of the Law of Affirmative Obligations, 72 VA. L REv. 879
(1986).
In the text, I shall concentrate on what I take to be a plausible moral duty of easy
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brace a grave danger would be supererogatory-beyond the call of
moral duty.
In fact, Waldron errs in formulating the third feature that a
moral duty analogous to a PJA must possess. Earlier I argued that
only a qualified PJA is worthy of consideration. If a PJA is qualified, nonacquirers need not be jeopardized. Hence Waldron has
not made out a case for holding that it may be "dangerous" for
nonacquirers to discharge their duties.
It is also problematic to formulate the third feature in terms
of
moral
embarrassment.
If
"morally
embarrassing"
means pertaining to a moral duty whose discharge would cause
embarrassment to the duty-holder, then perhaps the duty applies
anyway. Suppose that a man leaving a brothel can save an unconscious drunk whose face lies in a puddle with virtually no risk to
the safety of and with no financial cost to the rescuer, but at
some risk to his reputation if his presence in the brothel becomes
known. The man, I believe, has a moral duty to save the drunk.
Now Waldron's discussion suggests that "morally embarrassing" might mean instead conflicting with prior duties owed by the
duty-holder. This interpretation tallies better with his remark that
a "parent may have a duty to see that his child is fed; but his
ability to discharge this duty will be undermined if the resources
which the child needs have been put 'off-limits' by the appropriation of someone else."45 The cogency of this portion of feature
(3), under this interpretation, depends on the weight of the prior
duties. Suppose that a woman can save an infant who is drowniig
in a wading pool at no risk to life or limb. If the prior duty is to
meet someone at the theater on time, it would take a moral ninny to say that the woman should not save the infant. The response would be different if it really were the case that the woman could save the child only by failing to perform some prior
nonpostponable duty to save someone else's life.
Where does this leave us? First, the third feature is plausible
only if it is reformulated in something like the following way:
(3')

discharging the duty may be personally embarrassing
or mildly onerous, but creates no substantial risk to

rescue. It applies when the potential rescuer can save someone from death or serious
injury with little risk or financial cost to the rescuer. It does not require that the rescuer risk life or limb or incur great expense.
45 J. WALDRON, supra note 2, at 268. See also the subsequent reference to its being
"morally difficult or morally impossible to . . . discharge their other responsibilities." Id.
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the duty-holder and does not require ignoring some
prior duty of equal or greater weight.
Second, (3') comes much closer than (3) to capturing a portion of
the moral duty to rescue as usually understood. There may be
reasons to reject the analogy between the duty to recognize acquisitions of property and the moral duty to rescue, but Waldron
does not state them accurately. Third, these two points are connected with Waldron's earlier unclarity on whether a PJA can be
qualified so as to preclude jeopardizing survival.
I turn now to a final problem with Waldron's argument-a
problem that concerns the intentions of acquirers. To the four
features listed earlier he adds a fifth: "(5) the action a is performed by x with the intention of imposing the duty described in
(1)(4)."46 Waldron adds this feature because he holds that "to
perform an act with the intention of acquiring rights is necessarily
to perform it with the intention of imposing duties on other peo47
ple."
This fifth feature is unsatisfactorily formulated because it ignores some difficulties with so-called verbs of propositional attitude-such as "intend," "believe," "think," "desire," and so on. The
root question here is how to describe accurately what, if anything,
potential acquirers must intend in doing something to gain property rights. My own view is that, in the context of original acquisition in a state of nature, it is quite difficult to specify the minimum content of an intention to gain property rights. It seems
likely that acquirers must intend to claim some Hohfeldian elements-for example, claim-rights to possess and use the acquired
item and a power to exclude others from it.48 But whatever exactly they intend, it does not follow that they also intend all the
equivalences and logical or moral consequences of what they intend. And a person who intends to impose "duties on other people" by acquiring property under a PJA may not intend to impose
"the duty described in (1)-(4)." 4o

46 Id. at 269.
47 Id.
48 S. MUNZER, stpra note 4, at 75-76.
49 J. WALDRON, supra note 2, at 269. The expression "propositional attitudes" goes
back at least to B. RUSSELL, AN INQUIRY INTO MEANING AND TRUTH 210 (1940). Later
discussion has centered on problems of substituting synonymous, codesignative, or coex-

tensive terms in belief contexts. See, e.g., W. QUINE, WORD AND OBJECT 141-56 (1960);
Bell, What is Referential Opacity?, 2 J. PHIL. LOGIC 155 (1973); Burge, Belief and Synonymy,
75 J. PHIL. 119 (1978); Mates, Synonymity, in SEMANTICS AND THE PHILOsOPHY OF LAN-
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I The key phrase in the formulation of the fifth feature is
"with the intention of imposing the duty described in (1)-(4)." On
the one hand, the phrase could mean that x intends to impose
a duty that x knows and intends to have the onerous moral consequences listed in features (1) to (4). This interpretation is
Waldron's iriew but it is implausible. If x is unaware of
the correlativity of claim-rights and duties, x may intend to acquire a claim-right regarding some item but not to impose any
correlative duty on someone else. Even if x knows that a claimright has some correlative duty, x may be unaware which duty others have. Further, even if x's property right imposes a duty that
has features (1) to (4), x may be unaware of these features and so
may not be able to intend them. In fact, the formulation of feature (3) is, as argued above, defective. Were x to intend a duty
with features (1) to (4), his intention would be intellectually confused.
On the other hand, this phrase could mean that x intends
to impose a duty that, unbeknownst to him and quite possibly
unintended by him, has certain moral consequences for others.
This interpretation is plausible but it is not Waldron's view.5"
Anyway, we have already supplied reasons for objecting to
the formulation of feature (3) and substituting a weaker feature (3'). We also need a weaker version of (5). A rough stab
might be:

(5')

the action a is performed by x with the intention of
acquiring some rights, which rights will have various,
possibly unintended, moral consequences, including
a correlative duty as described in (1), (2), (3'), and
(4).

The substitution of (5') makes x look less consciously uncaring
and nasty than (5) does.
To sum up: At the outset, it is debatable whether a duty
to recognize property acquisitions must be familiar in the sense of
being analogous to some other moral duty. Furthermore, Waldron
explains the features of a PJA so as to make it much
less attractive than it needs to be. A suitably qualified PJA need

Linsky ed. 1952).
50 This interpretation seems incompatible with his references to suicide attempts
that "cry for help" and a child's experimentation "with moral relations to find out what
he has to do in order to oblige his parent to help him." J. WALDRON, supra note 2,
at 269, 270.
GUAGE 211 (L
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not jeopardize the survival of others. It does not require that
others ignore some prior duty of equal or greater weight. Though
a duty to recognize property rights may not be analogous to a
duty to rescue, Waldron fails to provide sound reasons for questioning the analogy, and he mischaracterizes the nature of a duty
to rescue. Finally, someone who acquires property rights under a
plausible PJA need not intend to impose burdensome duties on
others.
IV. WHY A QUALIFIED PRINCIPLE OF JUSTICE IN
ACQUISITION COULD BE FAMILIAR AND PLAUSIBLE
A case for a PJA that depended entirely on criticisms of
Waldron would be unsatisfying. Are there any reasons for the
view that a qualified PJA could be a familiar and plausible addition to a morality like our own? Indeed there are. At least two
reasons exist for thinking that a suitably qualified PJA should be
part of a set of principles that can justify rights to private property. The first reason is the lack of moral appeal in being generally
entitled to benefit from another's efforts. The second is the prominence of deserving something in our morality. I shall investigate
each in turn, but wish to stress that conducting the investigation
is compatible with the criticism in Part III that familiarity is not
required for plausibility. The present part meets Waldron on his
own turf. And there may be an asymmetry in that while lack of
familiarity need not count against a PJA, the existence of familiarity can count in favor of a PJA.
A.

General Entitlement to Benefit from
Another's Efforts

The first reason is that it is not morally appealing to say that
one person is generally entitled to benefit from another's efforts.
One version of this reason goes back at least to Locke. He seems
to hold that since no one would labor without expecting some
benefit, it would be unfair to let-the idle take the benefit of the
laborer's pains.5 ' Lawrence C. Becker finds Locke's position, appropriately reconstructed, somewhat appealing: "It is not so much
that the producers deserve the produce of their labors. It is rather
that no one else does, and it is not wrong for the laborer to have
[it]."52
51 J. LOCKE, Second Treatise, supra note 5, § 34.
52 L BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHIC FOUNDATIONS 41 (1977). See generally
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One can develop Locke and Becker by constructing what I
shall call a reductio ad dubium. Suppose that one were to say that
those who can labor on or otherwise acquire unowned things but
choose not to do so are entitled to intercept the benefits pro-,
duced by the person who works. Of course, the nonworkers do
not have to exercise their entitlement. They could consent not to
do so. But to require consent would grant nonconsenting nonworkers a moral immunity against being affected by the worker's
labor. It would also give them a moral liberty to help themselves
to the product of this labor since the worker, lacking property
rights, would have no moral power to exclude them. Moreover, it
would enable nonworkers to say to the worker: If you will not do
something for us, we shall block your claim to any property rights
in the product of your labor, no matter how hard you work. For
nonworkers to insist on this point seems intuitively to be morally
wrong. It is an effort to intercept the fruits of the worker's labor
and seems at least distantly akin to extortion. Now any position
that countenances this sort of moral wrong and interception of
benefits is transparently faulty. Therefore this position is reduced
to implausibility. Hence there is a lack of moral appeal in being
generally entitled to benefit from another's effort.
Lest the reductio argument be misunderstood, I should make
several points immediately. The argument, as I advance it, presupposes that any entitlement on the worker's part to property rights
rests on a suitably qualified PJA. I elaborate on this presupposition
elsewhere. The following summary is not a substitute for the arguments it summarizes. If we are talking about original acquisition
in a state of nature, a plausible PJA must presuppose some things
about background conditions in the state of nature, features of
the laboring situation, and physical and psychological effects of
laboring. There must, for example, be some assumptions about
the quantity and quality of unowned things that are open to acquisition. 3 If we are dealing with original and subsequent acquisition in a modern society, a plausible PJA must carry many qualifications. These relate, in my opinion, to the rights held by and
duties owed to others, the process of acquisition, post-acquisition
changes in situation, transfer, general scarcity, and the nature of
work as a social activity. For instance, we should recognize the

id. at 41-43.
53 The "initial labor theory" presented in S. MUNZER, supra note 4, at 256-66, offers
one way to specify relevant presuppositions.
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right of everyone to have the necessities of life.5 4
Moreover, the reductio argument shows only that nonworkers
lack a general entitlement to benefit from the worker's efforts. It
permits special entitlements. For instance, minor children should
be entitled to benefit from the efforts of their parents. And any
adult who lacks the physical or mental capacity to work is entitled
to benefit from the efforts of those who do work.
Again, the reductio argument hardly daims that it is ahlay ipenssible for some persons to benefit from another's efforts. It claims
only that they are not generally entitled to do so. In any well-functioning economy, it would be astonishing if the different jobs that
different people do failed to provide mutual benefits.
Finally, the reductio argument supplies only a negative reason
for holding that a suitably qualified PJA could be a familiar and
plausible addition to a morality like our own. It does not give a
reason why workers are entitled to benefit from their efforts by
gaining property rights. It gives a reason why nonworkers are not
generally entitled to benefit from the efforts of workers. This negative reason is still important, for it rests on some familiar features
of our morality. Chief among them is the moral inappropriateness
of asserting a general entitlement to benefits, produced by others,
to which one has made no contribution.
Why does Waldron overlook the lack of moral appeal in
being generally entitled to benefit from another's efforts? I do
not know. But a possible answer looks to his chapter on Locke.
Though this chapter runs to 116 pages and discusses most aspects
of Locke's theory in illuminating detail, he gives short shrift to
Locke's treatment of desiring "the benefit of another's Pains."5 5
The chapter quotes this passage once but makes little of it.5 6 It

seems to refer in part to the passage later. Waldron considers the
possibility that "one might say that the idle and the covetous deserve to forfeit their rights over previously common resources as
a punishment for their sloth. This fits roughly with what Locke
says in II.4."
It could be that punishment or penalty is what

54 I call this the "revised labor theory," which is another term for the labor-desert principle. Id. at 254, 266-85. For present purposes I ignore the relations between the initial
and revised labor theories and the issue of whether a fragment of the revised theory
could be understood to apply to original acquisition in a state of nature.
55 J. LOCKE, Second Treatise, supra note 5, § 34.
56 J. WALDRON, supra note 2, at 192. He refers to other aspects of § 34 of Locke's
Second Treatise at 147, 157, 171, 201, 218.
57 Id. at 206-07.
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Locke had in mind. But it is philosophically more cogent to emphasize the nonworker's lack of general entitlement under a suitably
qualified PJA. At any rate, since so much of Waldron's book
is Locke-related, it may be that Waldron, having overlooked
the significance of getting "the benefit of another's Pains"
in Locke, overlooked other versions of this point.5 8
B.

The Prominence of Desert

A different reason for thinking that a PJA could be familiar
and plausible is that our morality gives prominence to deserving
something. The verb phrase "could be" is used advisedly. For the
argument to go through, a PJA must refer to deserving property
rights. Most PJAs-for instance, those of Locke, Nozick, and
Gauthier-do not refer to deserving property rights. But some
PJAs do. A noteworthy example, published some years before
Waldron's book, is Becker's desert argument for acquiring property by labor.59 Another example, published after Waldron's book,
is my principle of desert based on labor.6 °
I believe that desert, broadly understood, is a familiar and
prominent feature of morality. People commonly suppose that
many things can be deserved-both desirable things, such as rewards, prizes, and gratitude, and undesirable things, such as punishment or condemnation for crimes. Now it may be, as George
Sher argues, that no single principle or value grounds ll varieties
of desert. 1 There might be several such principles or values.
Even so, desert remains familiar in our moral thinking. There
need be nothing strange in a PJA that refers to desert.
Waldron might respond that desert, whatever its place in
morality generally, is not likely to be a part, or at least a central
part, of a PJA. I agree that some conceivable principles referring
to desert would be silly. An example would be the following possible principle: Anyone who touches his or her nose while
standing on land deserves property rights in the land. But a principle would be plausible rather than silly if we could explain why
the allegedly deserving action is a good one and why property
rights are a fitting benefit. I believe that the best suitably quali-

58 Here I allude to Becker's book and not my own. I do not expect Waldron to be
clairvoyant.
59 L BECKER, supra note 52, at 48-56.
60 S. MuNZER, supra note 4, at 254-91.
61 See G. SHER, DESERT at xii, 20, 110 (1987). See generally id at chs. 7 and 8.
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fled PJA will refer to desert, as I argue in my book. If that argument is sound, then, pace Waldron, a PJA is rather more familiar
and appealing than he allows.
All the same, Waldron's insightful book and my subsequent
conversation with him compel me to develop my case. They have
certainly spurred my constantly flagging efforts at self-criticism.
Waldron's book argues against the centrality of desert in acquiring property. His arguments fall into two groups. The first group
has to do with the interpretation of Locke. The second group
deals with desert in a more independent fashion. In what follows,
I shall suggest that the former arguments are irrelevant to the
present inquiry and that the latter arguments are unconvincing. I
shall then grapple with some questions about desert that Waldron
propounds.
1. Waldron's Interpretation of Locke
Waldron contends that desert is an alternative, but implausible, interpretation of Locke.6" On the one hand, he claims that
"the evidence for interpreting Locke's discussion as a theory of
desert is very slender."6" I agree. But this point is not relevant
to whether a plausible PJA could refer to desert. On the other
hand, Waldron suggests, even in his discussion of Locke, that
what Waldron calls the "Desert Theory"6 4 is philosophically unattractive. This suggestion, as applied to Locke, requires the premise that we should not, in charity, attribute a philosophically unattractive theory to someone unless there is clear evidence that he
holds the theory-which in Locke's case there is not. This point is
also irrelevant to the present inquiry, unless the "Desert Theory"
turns out, upon independent philosophical examination, to be
unattractive.
2.

Waldron's Independent Examination of Desert

Waldron's independent examination of desert, in the chapter
on Locke and elsewhere in the book, does not show it to be
philosophically unappealing. The discussion has at least three
flaws.
First, Waldron does not distinguish sharply enough between

62 J.

WALDRON,

supra note 2, at 201-07.

63 Id. at 206.
64 Id. at 202, 204, 205, 206.
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the role of desert in original acquisition and 'its role in subsequent acquisition. He points out that if we give desert a role in a
PJA, then perhaps it should have a role in the rights of later
persons and not only of initial acquirers. He asks: "If labour
counted as deserving in the beginning, why does it not count as deserving now?"65 The answer is that it counts at both times.
Waldron continues: "But if later patterns are assessed (and redistributed in accordance with desert) then the historical entitlement
character of the Lockean theory of property is undermined."6 6
Here the word "qualified" would be more apt than "undermined."
Insofar as Waldron is making a point about Locke, we can cede
him Locke. But since we are now asking about desert independently, we can see that it would make perfect sense to say that
later episodes of deserving behavior-whether that *behavior be
acquisition, labor, or whatever-can qualify a PJA that at first deals
only with original acquisition.
This shortcoming arises in another passage: "If the Desert
Theory is taken as an interpretation of Locke's theory of property, the reward amounts to full and exclusive property rights in the
resources one has worked on."6 7 We can concede the consequent as an interpretation of Locke. But, viewed independently,
the property rights need not be "full and exclusive." One could
have a different view of labor and desert that qualifies rights in
these resources. The labor-desert principle does exactly that.
Second, Waldron distorts and overemphasizes the role of
consequentialist and compensatory considerations in desert.
He lists two grounds for rewarding labor. One is to encourage desirable behavior. The other is to compensate people for work that
is unpleasant or onerous."
The former ground distorts the notion of desert, for that
notion is not at bottom consequentialist. To reward deserving
people may well promote the utility of those people and others.
But this is a side effect. The ground or basis of desert consists of
something that people do-be it work or something else. It does
not lie in the fact that it would promote their utility to have a

65 Id. at 204.
66 Id. (footnote omitted).
67 Id. A little later Waldron writes: "But Locke's theory implies something stronger--that this reward [full value of the materials worked on] ought to be given and that
the labourer is entitled to it." Id. at 205 (emphasis in original). Even if the assertion is
true of Locke, it is not true of labor and desert viewed independently.
68 Id. at 204.
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reward, or that it would encourage them or others to behave in a
certain way in the future.
The latter ground captures part of the notion of desert. Rewarding labor may be appropriate because people expended a
good deal of effort to do something that was unpleasant or onerous. But there may be other factors. So we do not yet have a ful
account of when rewards for labor are in order, or even whether
"reward" is always the appropriate concept. Waldron therefore
overemphasizes the importance of compensation.
Third, the few references to desert outside the chapter on
Locke either fail to torpedo the "Desert Theory" or, perhaps inconsistently, leave room for desert after all. One is a brief reference to "moral desert"69 in the chapter on historical entitlement.
The reference is too fleeting to assist the discussion. A second
refers to moral desert in connection with liberty and the performance of moral duty in the chapter on general-right-based arguments.7 ° Again the reference is fleeting. In his final chapter,
Waldron reminds the reader of the earlier rejection of a desertbased interpretation of Locke, and then adds:
But considerations of desert may still be relevant to the case
for private property, and the argument based on desert-even
if it cannot sustain the burden of justifying a system of private
property-should not be dismissed until we are sure that
it
7
draws to our attention nothing that we ought to consider. '
Waldron does not elaborate. This passage makes space for desert
after all. I shall return to this point in the Conclusion.
3.

Waldron's Questions About Desert

Injecting desert into the theory of property is defensible only
if we can deal with the trio of tough questions that Waldron asks
about desert. Here is what he requests: "The claim that an action
deserves a reward invites three questions: (1) What makes the
action a good action? (2) Why should it be rewarded (as opposed
to merely noted, praised or approved)? and (3) What reward is

69 Id. at 257.
70 Id. at 309 & n.54.
71 Id. at 442.
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appropriate?"72
(a) An Initial Criticism.-Prior to confronting the questions
themselves, an initial difficulty that must be noted is Waldron's
framing of the request in terms of deserving a reward. To put the
matter in this way throws some of his analysis off course. And it
would throw ours off as well if we were to let the matter pass
unexamined. Skewing occurs because desert, not reward, is the
central concept here, and it is therefore a mistake to discuss
deserving property rights only in terms of reward. Stated
generally, rewards are not always deserved, and things deserved
are not always rewards. I shall return to this statement in
connection with Waldron's last two questions.
(b) "What makes the action a good action?"--In this context,
and at least in the standard case, working is a good action if it
satisfies two conditions. The first is that it yields something--whether a product or a service-that is good in some sense
or other. If, for example, a person worked mindlessly to produce
things that were not "good" in any sense, then though he or she
might have a right to them, it would be odd to speak of "desert."
If desert applies, the product or service is typically something that
the worker needs or wants. Since people tend to share many
needs and wants, the product or service is usually something that
others besides the worker need or want. Satisfying needs or wants
is one way for something to be at least prima facie good. By
working people produce food, clothing, and. shelter, and they
provide services from massages to appliance repair. All of these
examples involve work that causes an effect that is good in some
sense or other.
The second condition is that the worker must produce the
good effect with some appropriate intention or motivation. It will
suffice if, for example, the worker intends to produce food that
he or she, or members of a community, need in order to survive.
It seems not enough that the worker create a good result unawares or by accident. Nor would a good result launched by some
evil intention seem enough. In such cases, we would be reluctant
to say that the worker deserves property rights merely because the
result was good.

72 Id. at 202.
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A more detailed analysis would have to dispel some of the
vagueness of the reference to "some appropriate intention or
motivation." The example in the previous paragraph seems clearly
apt: The worker intends to produce food. Here the good intended is the good produced, and the worker goes through a process
that, let us suppose, everyone understands to be an appropriate
way to produce food. Other examples can raise problems. Suppose that A, a medical researcher, intends to cure cancer but
produces a cure for diabetes instead. Here the good intended is
not the good produced. Or suppose that A intends to cure cancer, and employs methods that other researchers justifiably regard
as harebrained and idiotic. Through a fluke, A comes up with a
cure for cancer. The good intended is the good produced. But
the process followed is hardly one that everyone regards as an
appropriate way to produce a cure for cancer. In both examples,
A produces a good effect and has a good intention. Still, one can
doubt whether A produces the good effect with "some appropriate intention or motivation," or at least whether there is a proper
connection between the good effect and the intention or motivation.
A deeper analysis would have to grapple with another problem. Earlier I remarked that the two conditions are necessary "at
least in the standard case." Are there nonstandard-say, fringe or
satellite-cases in which one of the conditions is dispensable? Consider B, the malevolent rose grower. B detests his neighbors. The
neighbors are avid flower gardeners. To make them green with
envy, B resolves to produce a bed of splendid roses next to the
neighbors' yard. B succeeds. Is B's action of working to produce
the roses a good action? It meets the first condition, for it produces something good-namely, beautiful roses. Yet perhaps it
does not meet the second condition. B's central intention or motivation is to make his neighbors highly envious. Someone might
object that B must also intend to grow beautiful roses. A possible
reply is that B might care nothing about roses and have no intention to produce them, and instead regarded them only as foreseen
concomitants or preconditions of the envious reaction that he does
intend." If this reply, or something like it, were successful, then
73 The reply raises issues that partly parallel and partly give the reverse side of issues raised by the doctrine of double effect. Roughly stated, this doctrine holds that
although certain bad effects must not be directly willed, they may be tolerated as the
foreseen concomitants of one's chosen means or ends. See, e.g., P. FOOT, The Problem of
Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect, in VIRTUES AND VICES AND OTHER ESSAYS IN
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B might not satisfy the second condition. Even so, it might be
claimed that B still deserves property rights in the roses. The case
of the malevolent rose grower suggests that there might be some
nonstandard cases in which one of the two conditions is unnecessary.
(c) "Why should it be rewarded (as opposed to merely noted,
praised or approved)?"--The good action deserves a reward only if a
reward is the most fitting benefit for the work. At least two sorts
of comparison are at stake in making determinations of
fittingness. One is a comparison of benefits. The other is a
comparison among persons. 4
In my terminology, the most general positive category of deserved thing or response is a benefit. Waldron's discussion of the
second question goes awry because he takes reward to be central.
I agree that people can sometipes deserve rewards. They can also
sometimes deserve property rights as a reward. Suppose that the
police announce a reward of $25,000 for actions leading to the
arrest of a dangerous escaped prisoner. An amateur sleuth may
deserve the money if she expends much effort in locating the
escapee and makes a successful citizen's arrest. I also agree that
Waldron is correct in contrasting rewards with notice, praise, and
approval. Here I would add that a full account would distinguish
rewards from such related items as awards, premiums, and prizes.
As pointed out earlier, rewards are not always deserved. Suppose that a clumsy person had bumbled into the escaped prisoner
and accidently knocked him unconscious. The police then arrested
the escapee. Here the bumbler might have a right to the reward.
But it would be odd to say that the bumbler deserved it.
Furthermore, things deserved are not always rewards, and
when property rights are deserved, they are not always deserved
as rewards. If we are dealing with original acquisition in a state of
nature, we need to know more about the details of that state of
nature. For instance, suppose that the state of nature is such that
each person works solely for himself or herself and entirely on
his or her own. Although each worker may deserve property
rights in what he or she produces, the property rights are not

MORAL PHILOSOPHY 19 (1978); Bennett, Whatever the Consequences, 26 ANALYSIS 83 (1966);
Mangan, An Historical Analysis of the Principle of Double Effect, 10 THEOL. STUD. 41 (1949).
74 See generally J. FEINBERG, Justice and Personal Desert, in DOING AND DESERVING 6567 (1970); Sterba, Justice and the Concept of Desert, 57 PERSONALIST 188, 191-95 (1976).
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exactly a reward. For a reward suggests something that is received
from others or from a community. If we are addressing original or
subsequent acquisition in a modern society, we must learn much
about that society to understand what benefit is most fitting. Here
the efforts of workers may deserve notice, praise, or approval,
but, if so, they will usually do so in addition to any property
rights. Once again, the property rights, whether in products or in
wages, need not be deserved exactly as a reward. A difficulty with
Waldron's second question is that he seems to presuppose that
property rights can be deserved only if they are a reward. This
presupposition is often false. For example, wages are, even if
deserved, not exactly a reward.
(d) "What reward is appropriate?"--Ifwe eliminate the mostly
inapposite idea of reward, we must answer why property rights
could be deserved. The good action of working deserves a benefit
in the form of property rights if such rights are a fitting benefit
for the work done. To determine whether such rights are fitting,
and, if so, exactly which sticks in the Hohfeldian bundle of claimrights, liberties, powers, and immunities are fitting, we must look
to many factors. For work in a state of nature, we should assess
the relative importance of effort, ability, persistence, industriousness, luck, time spent, achievement, the difficulty,
unpleasantness, or danger of the work, and other working
conditions.7 5 For work in modem economies, we must attend
to the social nature of work. This nature makes relevant
additional factors in assessing what is deserved. Among them
are the responsibility, leadership, or motivating capacity displayed
by one worker in relation to others. We can now see why
Waldron is on to something when he suggests compensating
people for unpleasant or onerous work. 76 We can also see why
compensation need not be tied to reward, and why many factors
bear on deserving property rights besides how unpleasant or
onerous a task is.
C. Synergy
This Part has made two points. One is the lack of moral ap-

75 Literature bearing on this assessment includes G. SHER, supra note 61, especially
chs. 2, 4, and 6; M. WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALrry 108-09, 165-83, 260 (1983); Slote, Desert, Cowtn, and Justice, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS.

323 (1973).
76 J. WALDRON, supra note 2, at 204. See text accompanying note 68 supra.
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peal in being generally entitled to benefit from another's efforts.
Another is the prominence of desert in our morality. The two
points, though independent, reinforce each other. If there is
something deserving in the laborer's efforts, that makes it easier
to see why it is morally unappealing to say that others are generally entitled to intercept the fruits of those efforts. And if the
inaction by nonworkers lacks moral appeal, it casts light on why
some efforts by laborers have a moral attractiveness that can be
seen in terms of desert.
V.

CONCLUSION

I have argued for the philosophical plausibility of an historical principle of justice in acquisition. The principle is "historical"
because it holds that past actions by persons may entitle them to
rights of private property. The most plausible historical principle
appeals to desert based on labor.
I have also tried to identify problems with Waldron's case
against an historical principle. In my view, he mischaracterizes
such a principle. And he mistakenly holds it to be unfamiliar
in morality. In contrast, I have suggested that an historical principle tallies admirably with the prominence of moral desert and the
lack of moral appeal in saying that someone is generally entitled
to benefit from another's efforts.
That said, I must discourage straightway much rejoicing
among libertarians. For the most plausible historical principle of
justice in acquisition, which I call the labor-desert principle, not
only receives heavy qualifications from within a suitably recast
labor theory of property. It is qualified also, in the pluralist theory that I advocate, by a principle of utility and efficiency and a
principle of justice and equality. Libertarians can take little joy in
77
these qualifications. Indeed, as I endeavor to show elsewhere,
chief among the practical implications of the labor-desert principle
is a justification not for wide disparities in income and wealth but
for protecting workers' interests within business corporations.
I should like to end on a note of intellectual charity in interpretation. Waldron may be of two minds regarding desert
and principles of justice in acquisition. The dominant line, supported by almost every scrap of relevant text, has us poles apart.
This line fails to investigate seriously the possibility of a qualified

77 See S. MUNZER, supra note 4, at 346-49, 352, 354, 355-57, 367.
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principle of justice in acquisition. It also is sharply skeptical of
deserving property rights.
Still, hints exist here and there of a rather different line that
places us in less disagreement. Waldron does not regard the expression "qualified principle of justice in acquisition" to be a contradiction in terms. It is possible that he wants mainly to insist
that qualifications be systematically related to the principle itself
rather than tacked on in ad hoc fashion. And in a striking passage he appears to leave room for desert in the theory of property.-" Should Waldron elaborate on these occasional hints, that
might effect some rapprochement of our positions. The disagreements between us do not seem to be political or ideological. They
relate chiefly to differences over the best philosophical analysis of
these difficult issues. The possibility of rapprochement may seem
speculative. But no speculation is needed to see that his intelligent book will force those who worry about the role of desert
and historical entitlement in the theory of property to reconsider
and develop their thoughts.

78 J. WALDRON, supra note 2, at 442, quoted at text accompanying note 71 supra.

